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JOHNSON

ARTICLE
Advocacy Strategies for Promoting Greater
Consideration of Climate Change and Human
Rights in Development Activities:
The Case of the West Seti Hydroelectric Project
in Nepal
*

LISE JOHNSON

I.

INTRODUCTION

Construction may soon begin on the West Seti Hydroelectric
Project (WSHP) in the western region of Nepal. The 750megawatt facility, which will produce power primarily for export
to India, involves construction of a 195-meter high dam on the
Seti River that will inundate over 2000 hectares of land.1 The
resulting reservoir, developments downstream of the dam, and
transmission lines running from the WSHP are predicted to affect
18,269 people in 2,421 households,2 requiring an estimated 1,393
of those households to be resettled.3

*

LL.M., Columbia Law School, 2009; J.D., University of Arizona Rogers
College of Law, 2004. Great thanks are due to Rabin Subedi for his information
and insight on hydropower development in Nepal. Thanks are also due to the
editors of the Pace Environmental Law Review for their thoughtful critiques.
Any errors remain those of the author alone.
1. SMEC West Seti Hydroelectric Corp. Ltd. (SMEC-WSHL), Project
Details, http://www.wsh.com.np/project-details/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). For
the purposes of this article, the SMEC West Seti Hydroelectric Corp. Ltd. will be
referred to as SMEC-WSHL.
2. SMEC-WSHL, WEST SETI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT ASSESSMENT (VOLUME 3), RESETTLEMENT PLAN: RESERVOIR AREA AND
DOWNSTREAM PROJECT COMPONENTS xi (2008), available at http://www.adb.org/
Documents/Resettlement_Plans/NEP/40919/40919-NEP-RP.pdf.
3. Id.
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The private and public entities promoting and financing the
project (at an expected cost of $1.6 billion)4—namely, SMECWSHL, the government of Nepal (GoN), and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB)—argue that the WSHP is a way of
enabling Nepal to generate much-needed revenue from use of its
rich water resources, and a means of enabling India to meet its
energy needs in an allegedly climate-friendly manner—two
important goals. It is currently impossible, however, for the
people of Nepal to determine what price is being paid in order to
accomplish those aims. This is because the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) prepared by SMEC-WSHL, and approved by
both the ADB and the GoN as a prerequisite to their respective
approvals of the WSHP, leaves certain major issues regarding the
project’s possible economic and environmental costs inexplicably
unaddressed.5 Those major omissions in the EIA all relate to its
failure to take climate change into account even though scientific
projections indicate that the phenomenon will affect the longterm viability of the project, its economic returns for investors
and Nepal, and its environmental and social consequences.6
In light of the severe and long-term consequences of unwise
development of a major dam project such as the WSHP—a project
which will irreversibly destroy ecosystems, permanently alter
land and water use in the development region, necessitate
relocation and resettlement of thousands of people, and require
investment of vast sums of government and private funds—this
paper addresses the significant omissions in the WSHP’s EIA in
an attempt to ensure that development of the project, if pursued,
proceeds only with full disclosure of its possible costs and
benefits. Only through such disclosure will development of the
project be consistent with the human rights of the Nepali people.
In Part II, this paper highlights the key climate change-related
omissions from the EIA that render its portrayal of the project
misleading.7 Then, in Part III, it discusses how the inadequate
4. INT’L RIVERS, MOUNTAINS OF CONCRETE: DAM BUILDING IN THE HIMALAYAS
11 (2008), available at http://internationalrivers.org/files/IR_Himalayas_rev.pdf.
5. See infra Part II.
6. Id.
7. This paper focuses specifically on climate change-related omissions from
the EIA. It does not aim to catalogue the myriad other environmental and
human rights issues arising out of development of the WSHP. For a discussion
of some of those issues, see, e.g., INT’L RIVERS, supra note 4 (discussing issues
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EIA violates the human rights of Nepalese people as guaranteed
under both domestic Nepalese and international law. In Part IV,
the paper suggests some promising options that advocates can
use to remedy those violations. Finally, in Part V, this paper
broadens the discussion beyond the West Seti; and illustrates
how climate change-related considerations may affect other major
development projects’ environmental and economic costs and
benefits, and therefore should increasingly be taken into account
during project selection and design. It then identifies how, if such
considerations are not adequately addressed, advocates can seek
to remedy those failings by employing the same or analogous
strategies suggested for use in the case of the WSHP.
II. WSHP DETAILS
In 1994, the GoN negotiated a memorandum of
understanding with the Snowy Mountains Engineering Company
(SMEC), an Australian corporation, to explore and begin
pursuing development of the WSHP.8 Among its provisions, the
1994 agreement provided that SMEC, through a subsidiary
company it established under the laws of Nepal, the West Seti
Hydroelectric Corporation Limited (SMEC–WSHL), would
initiate work to prepare a Detailed Engineering Report (DER) on
the project.9 In 1997, SMEC-WSHL and the GoN entered into
additional agreements to further the development of the WSHP:

with the WSHP and other planned developments in the Himalayas); Ananta Raj
Luitel, West Seti Verdict a Watershed—“Decision Not in National Interest”,
HIMALAYAN TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008; YUKI TANABE, JAPAN CTR. FOR A SUSTAINABLE
ENV’T & SOC’Y, REPORT ON THE WEST SETI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT AND ADB
POLICY VIOLATIONS (2007), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/
JACSES_Report_on_West_Seti.pdf. Also, for a discussion of issues arising out of
construction of large dams generally, see, e.g., INTERAMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, LARGE DAMS IN THE AMERICAS: IS THE CURE WORSE
THAN THE DISEASE (2009), available at http://www.aida-americas.org/aida.php?
page=203&lang=en; THAYER SCUDDER, THE FUTURE OF LARGE DAMS: DEALING
(2005);
WITH SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL COSTS
JACQUES LESLIE, DEEP WATER: THE EPIC STRUGGLE OVER DAMS, DISPLACED
PEOPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2005); PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS:
THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS (2001); WORLD COMM’N ON DAMS,
DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING (2000).
8. West Seti Hydroelectric Project Agreement (1994) (on file with the
author).
9. Id.
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the first agreement, reached in May, related to the export of
electricity from the proposed WSHP;10 and the second, reached in
June, was a “Project Agreement” setting forth the terms and
conditions for “proceed[ing] with the objective of implementing
the [750 MW WSHP].”11
The Project Agreement stated that SMEC–WSHL would
prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the
WSHP “as part of the DER in accordance with the National
Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2050, the
Environment Protection Act, 2053 and any relevant rules and
guidelines made thereunder.”12 SMEC–WSHL submitted the
DER to the government in December 1997, and received approval
of that report in January 1999.13 Subsequently in August 1999,
SMEC–WSHL submitted the EIA to the government.14 Nepal’s
relevant agency, the Ministry of Population and Environment
(now the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology)
approved the WSHP in 2000.15 In 2007, SMEC–WSHL prepared
an updated EIA to assess project impacts on the transmission line
connecting the power generated by the WSHP to the Indian
electricity transmission grid, as well as to incorporate new
information on increased costs and the project’s plan to resettle
and relocate Nepali people affected by the project.16
As the EIA describes, the project involves construction of a
195 meter-high concrete-faced rock-fill dam, creating a 2,060hectare reservoir area with a total storage capacity of 1,566
million cubic meters of water.17 The project will require the
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id. pmbl., para. D.
Id.

SMEC-WSHL, WEST SETI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT ASSESSMENT (VOLUME 1), MAIN REPORT 6 (2000) [hereinafter 2000
EIA], available at http://www.wsh.com.np/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/eia_vol1_
complete_document.pdf.
14. Id. at 30.
15. W. SETI HYDRO LTD. FOR THE ADB, SUMMARY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT, NEPAL: WEST SETI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT 1 (2007)
[hereinafter 2007 EIA], available at http://www.adb.org/documents/environ
ment/nep/40919-nep-seia.pdf.
16. Id. In the text, this paper uses the term “EIA” to refer to both the original
EIA, and any subsequent additions to it, such as this 2007 EIA. If only one is
referred to, the text or accompanying footnote will make that clear.
17. Id. at 2.
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acquisition of 2,326 hectares of land, including 659 hectares of
cultivated land, 806 hectares of forest, 246 hectares of grassland
and 169 acres of shrub land.18 The entirety of the WSHP is
located in the Far-Western Development Region of Nepal, one of
the country’s least developed and poorest areas, with a poverty
rate of 41% that is well above the national average of 31%.19
The project is being constructed as a build-own-operatetransfer scheme, whereby SMEC–WSHL has a thirty-year
generating license covering the WSHP’s predicted 5.5-year
construction phase, and the first 24.5 years of the project’s
commercial operation.20 At the end of that time frame, the project
will be transferred entirely to the GoN.21 Pursuant to a power
purchase agreement between SMEC–WSHL and the Power
Trading Company (India) Limited (PTC), once the WSHP begins
commercial operation, for the following twenty-five years, PTC
will purchase from SMEC-WSHL the power generated by the
project.22 PTC, in turn, will sell that power to India.23 In return
for its hosting the project and submerging its land and resources,
the GoN will receive royalties from the sale of power to PTC, and
can also elect to either receive ten percent of the WSHP’s output
as free power, or ten percent of the revenue received from India’s
purchase of the electricity.24
According to SMEC–WSHL’s 2007 estimates, the GoN will
receive $991 million in revenue during the course of the 30-year
generation license, with an average annual benefit of $33
million.25 After the thirty-year license expires, SMEC-WSHL
projects that the GoN will receive $170 million per year in
revenue from electricity sales to India (assuming the prices in the
power purchase agreement between SMEC–WSHL and PTC
continue to apply).26 That revenue stream, however, will only be
temporary because the accumulation of sediment in the reservoir

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 2.
2007 EIA, supra note 15, at 2.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id.
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will eventually prevent the WSHP from being able to generate
power.27 According to the EIA, sedimentation in the reservoir
may terminate the hydropower project’s useful life within twentyfive years after the project is transferred to the GoN.28 At that
time, the government will have to decommission the dam, a
process which will require the government to perform a host of
significant tasks including: assessing the safety of the dam;
removing selected facilities and maintaining others; recycling and
disposing of materials and wastes, including hazardous wastes;
evaluating the effect of decommissioning on aquatic ecosystems
and uses of the river water; identifying ways to mitigate negative
effects of decommissioning; conducting ongoing maintenance,
surveillance, and security of retained facilities; and budgeting for
and financing these and other necessary activities.29
III. THE EIA, ITS SIGNIFICANT OMISSIONS & THEIR
IMPLICATIONS
As noted above, SMEC-WSHL submitted its EIA for the
project to the Nepalese government in August 1999, and received
approval of the document the following year.30 In 2007, SMEC–
WSHL prepared an updated EIA to assess impacts of the
transmission line connecting the power to the Indian electricity
transmission grid, as well as to incorporate new information on
increased costs and the project’s plan to resettle and relocate
Nepali people affected by the project.31 As required under Nepali
law,32 these EIAs (collectively referred to hereafter as the EIA),
27. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 241; W. SETI HYDRO LTD., WEST SETI
HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT PRELIMINARY DECOMMISSIONING PLAN 2-3 (2007)
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY DECOMMISSIONING PLAN].
28. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 241; PRELIMINARY DECOMMISSIONING PLAN,
supra note 27, at 2-3.
29. PRELIMINARY DECOMMISSIONING PLAN, supra note 27, at 8.
30. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 30.
31. 2007 EIA, supra note 15.
32. Environment Protection Rules (Nepal), Schedule 2(e) (1997) (requiring an
EIA for projects involving the “[o]peration of electricity generation projects with
a capacity of more than 5 mw,” “[c]onstruction of multipurpose reservoirs,” and
“[a]ny water resources development activity which displaces more than 100
people with permanent residence”), Schedule 2(j) (requiring an EIA for proposals
to be implemented in “[s]emi-arid, mountainous and Himalayan regions”),
Schedule 2(k) (requiring an EIA for “[o]peration of any planning, project or
programme relating to any developmental work, physical activities or change in
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were to detail the “technical, geographical, environmental,
economic, social, cultural and physical aspects of the proposal,”
and its alternatives’ “[s]hort, medium, and long-term adverse
impact[s].”33 Review and approval of the EIA by the GoN is a
prerequisite to development of the WSHP.34
The EIA, however, omits crucial environmental and economic
information, and consequently fails to provide either an accurate
picture of the WSHP’s impacts, or an adequate assessment of the
project’s alternatives. More particularly, the EIA fails to address
three critical issues: (1) the effects of climate change on the
WSHP and the extent to which climate change alters the
projected impacts of the project, (2) the implications of the WSHP
for greenhouse gas (GHG) sinks and emissions in Nepal, and (3)
the myriad economic and environmental issues associated with
dam decommissioning once the project is transferred to the
GoN.35

land use . . . with a cost of more than 100 millions” [sic]), available at
http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/index.php/ne/--/doc/491/raw.
33. Id. sched. 6, paras. 4, 7.
34. Environment Protection Act (Nepal), 2053, §§ 3-4 (1997), available at
http://www.elaw.org/node/1937.
35. While the laws and regulations governing preparation of EIAs do not
specifically require assessment of projects’ impacts on climate change, or
assessment of the projects as impacted by a changing climate, the broad
requirement that EIAs describe the “technical, geographical, environmental,
economic, social, cultural and physical aspects of the proposal,” and its and its
alternatives’ “[s]hort, medium, and long-term adverse impact[s],” would
presumably include impacts on and by climate change if such impacts were
reasonably significant and relevant to the project. Id. As the discussion in this
Part II aims to illustrate, the potential climate change-related impacts on and
by the WSHP are significant and merit attention. Case law in the United States
regarding analysis of environmental impacts under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2006), and its state law
analogues similarly supports the argument that if they are relevant to a
project’s environmental impacts, climate change-related considerations should
be taken into account in analyzing and selecting projects and policies. See, e.g.,
Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding that the federal agency’s Environmental Assessment under
NEPA was inadequate due to its failure to adequately address the impacts its
proposed rule and available alternatives would have on greenhouse gas
emissions); NRDC v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., No. BS 110792 (L.A.
Co. Super. Ct. July 28, 2008) (holding that the state entity’s failure to discuss
the impacts its rule would have on greenhouse gas emissions and climate
change violated California’s Environmental Quality Act).
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Effects of Climate Change on the WSHP

Evidence of the effects of climate change on Nepal’s diverse
climate, which ranges from tropical in the country’s low
elevations to arctic in the Himalayas,36 is already apparent. Data
on temperatures in Nepal from 1977-1994 reveal a general
warming trend, with temperature changes being most
pronounced during the country’s dry winters and in its higher
elevations.37 “Significant glacier retreat as well as significant
areal expansion of several glacial lakes have also been
documented in recent decades, with an extremely high likelihood
that such impacts are linked to rising temperatures” caused by
anthropogenic emission of GHGs.38 Climate change is also
thought to have produced more intense precipitation events in the
country, and to have resulted in decreased river flows in the dry
season.39
These trends of rising temperatures, retreating glaciers, and
more intense monsoon seasons are projected to continue. Based
on the IPCC’s “B2” scenario, which uses moderate assumptions to
predict future impacts of climate change,40 a 2003 study using
36. AHARDUL AGRAWALA ET AL., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN NEPAL: FOCUS ON WATER RESOURCES AND
HYDROPOWER 12 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/51/1974
2202.pdf.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 13; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(IPCC), WORKING GROUP II, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY 493 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4wg2.htm. See also GOV’T OF NEPAL & U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, PROJECT
DOCUMENT—NEPAL: NATIONAL ADAPTATION PROGRAMME OF ACTION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 1 (2008).
[A] range of recent scientific studies show that Nepal is highly vulnerable
to the potential negative impacts of climate change. Consistent rises in
annual mean temperature, less frequent but more intensive rainfall
events, increasing frequency and intensity of floods, changes in monsoon
on- and offset, growing threat from Glacial Lake Outburst Floods
(GLOF), longer dry spells and drought events, and increasingly stronger
storms have already been experienced in Nepal in the past decade.

Id.
39. AGRAWALA ET AL., supra note 36, at 14; see also IPCC, WORKING GROUP II,
supra note 38, at 476 (noting the observed occurrence of “[s]erious and recurrent
floods in . . . Nepal”).
40. The B2 scenario is one of a family of the IPCC’s Special Report on
Emissions Scenarios (SRES). The SRES scenarios “explore alternative
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various climate models predicted a “significant and consistent
increase in temperatures . . . for Nepal for the years 2030, 2050,
Scientists project such trends will trigger
and 2100.”41
accelerated “widespread mass loss from glaciers;”42 and that they
might also be accompanied by more intense summer monsoons,
which will, in turn, increase the risk of flooding and landslides.”43
development pathways, covering a wide range of demographic, economic and
technological driving forces and resulting GHG emissions . . . B2 describes a
world with intermediate population and economic growth, emphasizing local
solutions to economic, social, and environmental sustainability.” IPCC, FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 44 (R.K. Pachauri & A.
Reisinger eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/
syr/ar4_syr.pdf; see also IPCC, SPECIAL REPORT ON EMISSIONS SCENARIOS,
CHAPTER 4: AN OVERVIEW OF SCENARIOS (2000), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
ipccreports/sres/emission/091.htm.
41. AGRAWALA ET AL., supra note 36, at 15.
42. The IPCC’s Working Group II reported these findings in its SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS. See SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 40, at 49. In its
more detailed, 938-page report, the Working Group II included a specific
projection about the rate and extent of glacial loss, stating the following:
Glaciers in the Himalayas are receding faster than in any other part of
the world . . . and, if the present rate of [Himalayan glacial loss] . . .
continues, the likelihood of them disappearing by the year 2035 and
perhaps sooner is very high if the Earth keeps warming at the current
rate. Its total area will likely shrink from the present 500,000 to 100,000
km2 by the year 2035.
GROUP II, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 493
(2007). In January 2010, the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the IPCC and the CoChairs of the IPCC Working Groups issued a statement criticizing that
paragraph as including “poorly substantiated estimates of rate of recession and
date for the disappearance of Himalayan glaciers.” IPCC, IPCC STATEMENT ON
THE M ELTING OF H IMALAYAN G LACIERS (2010), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/present
ations/himalaya-statement-20january2010.pdf. The statement, however, also
emphasized that the issues with that particular paragraph in the nearly
thousand-page Working Group II report did not invalidate the report’s other
findings and conclusions. The January 2010 statement affirmed that earlier
projections regarding “[w]idespread mass losses from glaciers” remained “robust,
appropriate, and entirely consistent with the underlying science and the broader
IPCC assessment.” Id.
43. AGRAWALA ET AL., supra note 36, at 16. The models projected,
an overall increase in annual precipitation. However, given the high
standard deviation [reflecting inconsistent results of various models used
for the projections,] the results for annual precipitation should be
interpreted with caution. Even more speculative is the slight increase in
winter precipitation. The signal however is somewhat more pronounced
for the increase in precipitation during the summer monsoon months
(June, July, and August).
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Such projections relating to climate change have extremely
significant and pressing implications for hydropower development
Yet these
in Nepal and, more particularly, the WSHP.44
implications—three of which are discussed below—were not
addressed in the EIA.
i.

Glacial Lake Outburst Floods

Glacial lakes are common at high altitudes of the Nepal
Himalaya, forming and growing as glaciers melt and retreat.45
The water in these lakes is generally held by moraine (glacial
debris) or ice barriers.46 When the amount of water in the glacial
lakes increases, and/or the barriers of ice restraining the water
melt and thus weaken, the risk increases that the barrier will no
longer be able to restrain the impounded water, causing a glacial
lake outburst flood (GLOF).47 GLOFs can be extremely powerful,
and at “their extreme . . . can release millions of cubic meters of
water in a few hours.”48 With the floodwater, GLOFs also can
transport significant amounts of sediment and debris. GLOFs
are thus a concern for hydropower development because the
surges of water, sediment and debris can pose significant risks to
project structures, and can fill reservoirs with sediment, thereby
limiting the useful life of hydropower projects.49
Because melting and receding glaciers form glacial lakes and
can cause GLOFs, climate change, which is accelerating the pace
of glacial retreat, is increasing the number and size of glacial
lakes, as well as the number and severity of GLOFs in mountain

Id.
44. Id. at 17 (ranking as “high” (1) the certainty of climate change’s impacts
on water resources and hydropower development, (2) the “urgency” of the
impacts, (3) the severity of the impacts, and (4) the importance of the resource);
WORLD WILDLIFE FED’N (WWF), AN OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS, GLACIER RETREAT,
AND SUBSEQUENT IMPACTS IN NEPAL, INDIA AND CHINA 10 (2005), available at
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/himalayaglaciersreport2005.pdf
(discussing
how “[c]limate plays a large role in determining the feasibility of hydroprojects.”).
45. Richard Kattelmann, Glacial Lake Outburst Floods in the Nepal
Himalaya: A Manageable Hazard?, 28 NATURAL HAZARDS 145, 146 (2003).
46. Id. at 146-47.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. AGRAWALA ET AL., supra note 36, at 17.
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areas such as the Himalayas.50 The incidence and magnitude of
GLOFs is predicted to continue to rise with further global
warming.51
The 2000 EIA acknowledges the general problem of GLOFs.
It notes that there are eight known glacial lakes in the area
draining into the WSHP, with the surface areas of those lakes
ranging from 500 square meters to 800,000 square meters.52 It
also notes that GLOFs pose a risk of threat to the lives of WSHP
workers stationed in GLOF flood zones, and can destabilize the
reservoir foreshore, damage project facilities, and reduce the
reservoir’s storage capacity by increasing the flow of sediment.53
The EIA then asserts that the risks to the WSHP caused by
GLOFs can be adequately mitigated by (1) designing the dam so
as to be “resistant to GLOF surge waves,” and (2) installing a
monitoring and warning system to minimize risk to life.54
The EIA, however, fails to discuss how climate change is
likely to exacerbate the threats posed by GLOFs and to evaluate
the project in light of these enhanced risks. The EIA mentions
without elaboration that “there is a potential for new [glacial]
lakes to form due to the continued retreat of main valley
glaciers,” but provides no additional analysis regarding the
implications of a growing number of glacial lakes, and decreasing
stability of those lakes due to increased snow and ice melt.55
50. Erica J. Thorson, On Thin Ice: The Failure of the United States and the
World Heritage Committee to Take Climate Change Mitigation Pursuant to the
World Heritage Convention Seriously, 38 ENVTL. L. 139, 142 (2008).
51. UNFCCC, CLIMATE
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

CHANGE: IMPACTS, VULNERABILITIES AND ADAPTATION
20 (2008).

Global warming is causing the melting of glaciers in the Himalayas. In
the short term, this means increased risk of flooding, erosion, mudslide
and GLOF in Nepal . . . Because the melting of snow coincides with the
summer monsoon season, any intensification of the monsoon and/or
increase in melting is likely to contribute to flood disasters in Himalayan
catchments. In the longer term, global warming could lead to a rise in
the snowline and disappearance of many glaciers causing serious impacts
on the populations relying on the [seven] main rivers in Asia fed by melt
water from the Himalayas.

Id.
52.
53.
54.
55.

2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 71.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 154.

Id.
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Significantly, it offers no projections or analysis regarding the
impacts the increased occurrence of such floods might have on
fundamental issues such as the life of the project, the long-term
availability of water, and/or the quality of water in the reservoir.
By failing to assess how the project’s desirability and viability
might be affected by the likely increase in GLOFs, the EIA
presents a misleadingly incomplete picture of the WSHP’s
possible environmental and economic impacts.
ii.

Decreased Glacial Melt

Glaciers act as crucial reservoirs that, as they melt, provide
freshwater resources and support for rivers.56 The loss of
Himalayan glaciers and their freshwater storage capacity is
projected to eventually cause a reduction in stream flow and
resulting shortages of water that is currently relied upon by
millions for drinking, agriculture, and industry, and crucial for
ecosystem support.57
Without adequate glacial melt, some
perennial rivers in the Gangetic river basin (including the Ganges
River itself), to which the Seti eventually drains, could begin to
flow only seasonally.58
With respect to the WSHP in particular, as the ability of
glaciers to store (and then release) water in the project catchment
area decreases, the rate of inflow into the reservoir could also
fall.59 This, in turn, could dampen fundamental projections
regarding the amount of power and revenue the WSHP will
generate. Decreased inflow of glacial melt into the WSHP
catchment can also negatively impact the quality of water in the
reservoir and the quality of water released downstream of the
dam and power facilities.60 Yet, like the risks posed by increasing
56. IPCC, WORKING GROUP II, supra note 38, at 493; WWF, supra note 44, at
3.
57. IPCC, WORKING GROUP II, supra note 38, at 493; WWF, supra note 44, at
3, 27-28; ARGAWALA ET AL., supra note 36, at 17; U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME,
GLOBAL OUTLOOK FOR ICE AND SNOW 24 (2007), http://www.unep.org/geo/geo_
ice/PDF/full_report_LowRes.pdf.
58. IPCC, WORKING GROUP II, supra note 38, at 493.
59. WWF, supra note 44, at 7.
60. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 16 (stating that “[t]he residence of time of
stored water in the reservoir is an important parameter to consider when
examining water quality”). Id. at 122 (“Water quality within the reservoir will
primarily be a function of the quality of inflows entering the reservoir, local
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GLOFs, the EIA ignores these possible effects of climate change
when discussing the project’s economic returns and its
relationship with and impacts on water use and water quality in
the project area and the broader watershed.
iii. Increased Intensity of Precipitation Events
As mentioned above, a third projected effect of climate
change on Nepal is an increase of “intense precipitation events
(particularly during the monsoon)” that will, in turn, increase the
incidence of flooding, landslides, and sedimentation, each of
which are highly relevant to the feasibility and design of
hydropower projects.61 When acknowledging and discussing the
threats that flooding, landslides, and the accumulation of
sediment pose to the WSHP, however, the EIA ignored the issue
of climate change and its potential to heighten these risks.62 By
ignoring these issues, the EIA also fails to address the possibility
that the WSHP’s power generating capacity might be less and
useful life shorter than projected, and that calculations of
economic returns to the GoN might consequently be wholly
unrealistic.
B.

The WSHP and GHG Emissions

Nepal is a party to both the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change63 and the Kyoto Protocol.64 As a
developing country or “non-Annex I” party to those agreements,
Nepal does not have any specific obligations to reduce or limit its
GHG emissions.65 Nevertheless, as is discussed below, even
absent such obligations it is important for Nepal to ensure that it
is aware of the implications of the WSHP for its net GHG
emissions.
climatic conditions, the configuration of the reservoir and the period of
impoundment.”).
61. ARGAWALA ET AL., supra note 36, at 17.
62. See generally 2000 EIA, supra note 13; 2007 EIA, supra note 15.
63. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164, 166, 170 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
64. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, 33 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
65. Id. art. 3, Annex B (setting emissions reductions requirements for Annex
I Parties).
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For one, in the context of negotiations on a multilateral
agreement on climate change, many countries are discussing
ways to incentivize protection and maximization of carbon sinks
through enhancing forest conservation and improving
agricultural practices in developing countries.66 While it is not
clear what mechanisms will be used in a post-Kyoto international
climate change agreement to incentivize this protection of carbon
storage capability, it is nevertheless becoming increasingly clear
that in a world affected by climate change, the ability of domestic
lands to store carbon is an asset of developing countries that,
although presently difficult to value, should not be discounted.67
The EIA states that the WSHP will cause the submergence and/or
clearing of thousands of hectares of forests and shrub land that
serve as carbon sinks.
It also acknowledges that the
displacement of thousands of people affected by the dam may
place increased pressure on forests in resettlement areas.68 The
EIA, however, does not include any discussion of what options
and assets Nepal may be foregoing by destroying and putting
additional pressure on its carbon sinks given the added value of
those lands in a world attempting to tackle the challenges of
climate change.69

66. Many of these discussions have taken place pursuant to and in
accordance with a 2007 decision reached by the Parties to the UNFCCC in Bali.
That decision is entitled “Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing
countries: approaches to stimulate action.” Decision 2/CP.13, at 8, FCCC/
CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008). The Copenhagen Accord, taken note of by the
UNFCCC Parties at their December 2009 meeting, further emphasized the need
to incentivize protection of forests and established a fund, the Copenhagen
Green Climate Fund, to help serve that goal. Copenhagen Accord, Decision
2/CP.15, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Dec. 18, 2009).
67. See, e.g., UNFCCC, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE FOR LAND USE, LAND-USE
CHANGE AND FORESTRY ACTIVITIES UNDER ARTICLE 3, PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4, OF THE
KYOTO PROTOCOL: DRAFT CONCLUSIONS PROPOSED BY THE CHAIR 7-11, FCCC/
SBSTA/2008/L.11 (June 12, 2008) (containing Parties’ suggestions regarding
incentivizing forest conservation, including through provision of financial
resources and payments); Yemi Katerere, A Climate Change Solution?, WORLD
FINANCE 104-106 (May-June 2010) (discussing current and possible expanded
future use of financial mechanisms to incentivize developing countries to
conserve forest lands).
68. 2007 EIA, supra note 15, at 27-28.
69. See supra notes 67-68, 70; see generally EIA 2000, supra note 13; EIA
2007, supra note 15; see also WINROCK INT’L NEPAL, THE POTENTIAL OF
GENERATING CDM REVENUE FROM HYDROPOWER EXPORTED BY WEST SETI
HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT: A FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT (2006), http://www.
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The EIA likewise fails to provide adequate information about
the net impact that emissions generated by the project will have
on Nepal’s GHG account. Reservoirs such as WSHP emit
methane (CH4), a GHG with twenty-one times the global warming
potential70 of carbon dioxide.71
While the EIA briefly
acknowledges that “some indirect greenhouse gas emissions [will]
result from the decomposition of vegetation . . . inundated in the
reservoir,”72 it does not appear to consider any of the methane
emissions downstream of the reservoir though a “forming
consensus is that [large dam] downstream . . . emissions might be
responsible for a substantial release of CH4 to the atmosphere.”73
Yet, more fundamentally, the EIA dismisses the significance of
those emissions from the reservoir that it does acknowledge by
saying that such emissions are small when compared to the
emissions India will purportedly avoid generating if it can import
hydropower from the WSHP.74 This GHG accounting, however,
which offsets the emissions generated by Nepal against the
possible emissions reductions in India, is not consistent with the
current design of international law governing GHG emissions.
Under that framework, which holds each nation responsible for
its own emissions,75 the EIA incorrectly characterizes the WSHP’s
impacts on Nepal.76
adb.org/Clean-Energy/documents/NEP-FS-West-Seti-Hydroelectric.pdf
(discussing generally the loss of carbon sinks from the project).
70. U.S. EPA, Methane: Science, http://www.epa.gov/methane/scientific.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (a gas’s global warming potential is its relative
ability to trap heat in the atmosphere).
71. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 32.
From an environmental viewpoint, water-based energy generation may
produce a very minor amount of air pollution, and thus makes a minor
contribution to global warming in comparison to fossil fuel power
generation. This is in line with Nepal's commitment to the Convention on
Climate Change (1992), of which it is a signatory.

Id.
72. Id. at 165.
73. Ivan B.T. Lima et al., Methane Emissions from Large Dams as
Renewable Energy Resources: A Developing Nation Perspective, 13 MITIG.
ADAPT. STRAT. GLOB. CHANGE 193, 194 (2008).
74. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 165.
75. See generally UNFCCC, supra note 63 (discussing each nation’s duties
with respect to its own emissions); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, art. 3, Annex
B (imposing on countries the obligation to reduce their own emissions). There
are mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol in which one country can receive
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The Environmental and Economic Implications of
Dam Decommissioning

Factors such as the occurrence of major floods will hasten the
rate of sedimentation and consequently shorten the project’s
lifespan.77 Additionally, projected effects of climate change such
as increased GLOFs and more intense monsoon storms may
increase the rate of sediment accumulation in the reservoir,
thereby reducing the amount of revenue the GoN can generate
from the project. Although possible effects exacerbated by
climate change are directly relevant to analysis of the WSHP’s
environmental and economic impacts, the EIA does not consider
them. But even more striking is the EIA’s silence on the
environmental and economic impacts of dam decommissioning.
Dam decommissioning is “the full or partial removal of an
existing dam or its associated facilities or significant changes to
the operations.”78 It can involve either “mothballing” the project
(i.e., suspending all operations but maintaining the equipment in
working conditions so that operation can be resumed), or
abandoning it (i.e., stopping all operations, disposing of
equipment and materials and essentially abandoning the site).79
Based on the EIA’s conservative predictions regarding the rate of
sediment deposition in the reservoir, decommissioning in the
form of abandonment will likely be necessary for the WSHP
within fifty years of the start of the project’s operation.80 By that
time, the project will have been transferred to the GoN, which
credits for reducing emissions in another country. Under one such mechanism,
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), it may be possible for Nepal to
receive credits for reducing emissions in India. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note
64, art. 12 (defining the CDM). There are, however, certain criteria that a
project must meet before it is eligible for CDM credits, including that the project
supports sustainable development and that it represents “additional” emissions
reductions that would otherwise not have occurred. No large dams have
qualified for CDM credits. Moreover, even if they were to qualify for CDM
credits, certain carbon markets such as the European Trading Scheme do not
allow trading of credits generated from large hydropower projects such as the
WSHP. See generally WINROCK INT’L NEPAL, supra note 69 (discussing the
possibility of generating CDM credits from the WSHP).
76. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 166-67.
77. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 61-62.
78. PRELIMINARY DECOMMISSIONING PLAN, supra note 27, at 2.
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id. at 6-7.
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will consequently bear full responsibility for “[p]reparation and
implementation of [a] Detailed Decommissioning Plan.”81
Although the EIA makes no mention of the economic,
environmental, or technical issues associated with dam decommissioning, a “Preliminary Decommissioning Plan” prepared by
SMEC-WSHL provides an indication of the enormity of the
decommissioning task. Abandoning the project will require,
among other actions, the GoN to develop and implement a plan to
perform a hazard and risk assessment of dam stability;
indefinitely perform monthly safety and stability inspections of
the dam; indefinitely perform biannual inspections of the
transmission line’s safety and stability; entomb the underground
power station; de-energize the transmission line; remove and
dispose of surface facilities or transfer them to local communities;
remove and dispose of movable equipment and property,
including hazardous materials likely to be present such as oil,
grease, petroleum contaminated materials, batteries, and water
treatment
sludge;
assess
and
mitigate
impacts
of
decommissioning on the human uses and aquatic ecosystems of
the reservoir and downstream water resources; prepare a budget
for and fund decommissioning activities; and provide and train
personnel to perform decommissioning tasks.82
Those items suggest that the resources necessary to prepare
and follow a Detailed Decommissioning Plan for the WSHP will
be significant. Yet the EIA makes no attempt to assess, quantify,
or even discuss the possible or projected costs of this evidently
inevitable aspect of the WSHP’s life cycle. Its silence on the issue
prevents the EIA from being able to offer an accurate portrayal of
the project’s impacts.
IV. RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ARISING OUT OF THE
WSHP AND ITS INADEQUATE EIA
The EIA prepared for the WSHP fails to address the impacts
of climate change on the project, the project’s impacts on GHG
emissions, and the myriad issues related to decommissioning the
project. These omissions present a misleading view of the project
by ignoring fundamental risks to its economic viability,
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. at 2-11.
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environmental impacts, and long-term consequences for the
people of Nepal. The ignored impacts of climate change on the
project could terminate the project’s useful life earlier than
expected, thereby decreasing the amount of revenue to be
generated by the project for the GoN, and leaving the people of
Nepal with a massive structure for which they may owe
significant debts and be perpetually liable. Climate change
impacts could also change the EIA’s assumptions about the water
quality in the reservoir and downstream of the dam, with possible
negative—but unexplored—social and environmental impacts.
Due to the centrality of the omitted information to an
assessment of the costs and benefits of the WSHP, approval of the
project based on the deficient EIA violates the rights of Nepalese
people to information, to social justice, and to a clean
environment—rights that are enshrined in the Nepalese
constitution and supported and informed by international law.
The parties responsible for these violations include the GoN,
which approved the EIA in breach of its duties to protect its
citizens and the environment; the ADB, which is financially
supporting the project in violation of its own internal policies,
international baseline standards of conduct for financial
institutions, and its obligation under international law to respect
the human rights of those affected by its actions; and
SMEC/SMEC-WSHL, the private proponents of the project who
are responsible for preparing the deficient EIA and whose actions
are inconsistent with their duties to respect human rights and
their obligations under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (Guidelines).83 There are, however, mechanisms for
holding these actors to account. In order to advocate efforts to do
so, this section first argues more specifically how the WSHP and
its deficient EIA violate the human rights of Nepali people. The
following section then suggests strategies advocates can use to
cure these violations and seek accountability. Throughout the
83. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (OECD), OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 19 (2000), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/
1922428.pdf; see also John Ruggie, Promotion and Protection of all Human

Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the
Right to Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business
and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (discussing “the State
duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including
business; [and] the corporate responsibility to respect human rights”).
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discussion, it must also be kept in mind that the
advocated do not mean to be an anti-development or
campaign per se, but a “No-Bad-Development”
designed to ensure compliance with principles of
sustainable development.84
A.

529
strategies
“No-Dam”
campaign
informed

The Right to Information

Article 27 of Nepal’s Interim Constitution specifically
guarantees a right to information, stating that a fundamental
right of every citizen is “the right to demand or obtain
information on any matters of his/her own or of public
importance.”85 This right—fulfillment of which is often described
as a precondition to exercise other fundamental human rights86—
is similarly recognized by States worldwide,87 emphasized in a
host of international agreements and declarations,88 and
elaborated upon through judicial decisions.89 It is, as the United
84. See Dipak Gyawali, Epilogue, in THE NEPAL-INDIA WATER RESOURCES
RELATIONSHIP: CHALLENGES, 295, 300 (Dwarika N. Dhunkel & Santa B. Pun
eds., 2009). As opposed to,
Euro-American and environmental activists, whose concerns lie more in
stopping excess development of water structures, Nepali activists . . . are
more concerned with stopping bad developments but promoting good
ones. Indeed, given that much of the population in the Southern
countries still do not have access to electricity, clean drinking water,
basic flood protection and reliable irrigation, storage and diversion dams
have to be built: the debate in the South is really about how good ones
can be built and bad ones avoided. This has been expressed as the slogan
of ‘No Bad Dams!’ rather than ‘No Dams’ of the northern NGOs.

Id.
85. INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL art. 27 (2007).
86. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
87. Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Transparency,

Participation and
Accountability in International Economic Dispute Settlement: A Sustainable
Development Perspective, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL LAW 321, 328 (Hans Christian Bugge & Christina Voigt eds., 2008)
(stating that as of 2006, at least sixty-eight countries had enacted laws
protecting freedom of information).
88. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe, 38 I.L.M, 517 (enacted 2001).
89. See, e.g., Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 ¶ 62 (2004) (Grand
Chamber) (stating that in certain cases involving dangerous activities, “public
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Nations General Assembly recognized in its first session in 1946,
“a fundamental right and . . . the touchstone of all freedoms to
Likewise, the
which the United Nations is consecrated.”90
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
affirms both the right to “seek, receive and impart information”
and the role of that right as an essential component of another
key element of democracy, the right to freedom of expression.91
The right is further recognized as being integral to
environmental protection and sustainable development.92
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration adopted at the 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
emphasizes that because “[e]nvironmental issues are best
handled with the participation of all concerned citizens . . . [a]t
the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access
to information concerning the environment that is held by public
authorities.”93 Agenda 21, also adopted at UNCED, elaborates on
the importance of the right to sustainable development:
[I]n the specific context of environment and development,
the need for new forms of participation has emerged. This

includes a need for individuals, groups and organizations to
participate
in
environmental
impact
assessment
procedures, and to know about and participate in decisions,
particularly those that potentially affect the communities in
which they live and work.
Individuals, groups and
organizations should have access to information relevant to
environment and development held by national authorities,

access to clear and full information is viewed as a basic human right” in
Europe).
90. G.A. Res. I/59, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/I/59 (Dec. 14, 2006).
91. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19 (stating
“[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information . . ..”).
92. See generally NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT ASSESSMENT: PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION 77-82 (2008)
(discussing the links between access to information, EIAs, and sustainable
development).
93. U.N. Conference on Env’t & Dev., Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter
Rio Declaration].
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including information on . . . activities that have or are
likely to have a significant impact on the environment. . ..94
Refining and strengthening these principles, more than forty
countries have ratified the Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), which establishes
minimum standards countries must comply with to, among other
obligations, guarantee and protect their citizens’ rights of access
to information.95
The Aarhus Convention details “passive”
government obligations—i.e., obligations to respond to requests
for information—and “active” obligations—i.e., obligations to
obligations to collect, update, and disseminate information.96
Likewise, the UNFCCC, to which Nepal is a party, contains
“active” obligations to collect and disseminate information
relating to global warming, stating that “Parties shall . . . [t]ake
climate change considerations into account . . . in their relevant
social, economic and environmental policies and actions . . . [and]
[p]romote and facilitate . . . public access to information on
climate change and its effects.”97

94. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, ¶ 23.2
(1992) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Agenda 21]. See also Case Concerning
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (Judgment of April 20,
2010) ¶¶ 203-205 (stating that preparation of environmental impact
assessments in certain circumstances is now a requirement under international
law).
95. Convention on Access to Info. & U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Public

Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517; see also Benjamin W. Cramer, The
Human Right to Information, the Environment and Information about the
Environment: From the Universal Declaration to the Aarhus Convention, 14
COMM. L. & POL’Y 73 (2009) (discussing the Aarhus Convention).
96. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Aarhus Convention: Convention on Access

to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters: Content of the Convention: Access to Information,
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/contentofaarhus.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
97. UNFCCC, supra note 63, art. 6(a)(ii); see also id. art. 4(i) (stating that
Parties “shall . . . [p]romote and cooperate in education, training and public
awareness related to climate change and encourage the widest participation in
this process, including that of non-governmental organizations”); Kyoto Protocol,
supra note 64, art. 10(e) (stating that each Party “shall . . . facilitate at the
national level public awareness of, and public access to information on, climate
change.”).
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These connections between the right to information,
environmental protection, and sustainable development are
similarly evident in the domestic laws of Nepal, which give
content to the right to information in the environmental context
through its rules regarding assessment of and disclosure of
information in EIAs.98 Pursuant to the Environment Protection
Rules, 1997, proponents of projects meeting certain thresholds
(e.g., mining projects requiring relocation or resettlement of more
than 100 people, or hydropower projects capable of generating
more than 5 megawatts) must collect and publicly disclose
information relating to technical, geographic, environmental,
economic, social, cultural, and physical aspects of the proposals,
including possible direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the
project, both positive and negative.99 The information must also
describe impacts over the short, medium and long-term, discuss
consequences of non-implementation of the project, explain
options for reducing environmental impacts, and provide
references supporting its contents.100 The scope of EIAs—and,
therefore, the information to be automatically disclosed to the
public regarding covered projects—is broad.
Domestic environmental laws and Nepal’s obligations under
relevant international law such as the UNFCCC thus entitle
Nepalese citizens to receive an EIA of the WSHP that fairly
discloses its impacts, and that includes information about the
effects of climate change.101 The EIA upon which the WSHP’s
approval has been based, however, fails to meet those criteria;
and the crucial information it omits renders the information it
98. See generally CRAIK, supra note 92, at 77-82 (discussing the links
between access to information, EIAs, and sustainable development in
international law).
99. Environment Protection Rules, 1997, Schedule 6, Matters to be
Mentioned While Preparing Reports Relating to Environmental Impact
Assessment, available at http://www.unep.org/bpsp/EIA/Case%20Studies/NE
PAL%20%28EIA%29.pdf (Schedule 6 to the Environmental Protection Rules of
1997 is available on pages 71-72 of this document).
100. Id.
101. For a discussion of how the law has evolved to incorporate climate change
issues into environmental impact assessments, see CRAIK, supra note 92, at 21215. The developments Craik discusses in Canada can also be seen in the United
States. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and the Environmental
Review Process, 22 NAT’L RESOURCES & ENV’T 20 (Winter 2008) (discussing
developments in the United States regarding using the impact assessment
process to address climate change issues); see also supra note 35.
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does present about the economic and environmental impacts of
the project misleading.102
As the content of the right to
information has evolved and been informed by principles of
sustainable development,103 governments’ responsibilities to
protect the rights of its citizens,104 and third-parties’ obligations to
do no harm,105 the right to information now can be seen as
imposing on governments active obligations to ensure the
dissemination of accurate information.
When government
officials are responsible for reviewing and approving documents
such as EIAs, this “active” interpretation of the right to
information means they have a duty to ensure the information
provided is—at a minimum—not facially misleading.
This
obligation is especially strong in the cases when those most
impacted by major development projects are traditionally
marginalized and oppressed groups who face significant hurdles
in taking independent steps to seek and obtain relevant
information. To read the content of the right to information
otherwise would essentially render the right meaningless in
circumstances when its guarantees are likely needed most.
Consequently, by approving the deficient EIA, SMEC-WSHL,
the GoN and ADB violated the rights of the people of Nepal to
information regarding the development of a massive
infrastructure project.

102. See infra Part II.
103. See generally supra notes 91-97.
104. See, e.g., John Ruggie, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights,

Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5, ¶ 5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (“[T]he State duty to
protect . . . lies at the very core of the international human rights regime.”);
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, John Ruggie, Addendum: State Obligations to Provide Access to

Remedy for Human Rights Abuses by Third Parties, Including Business: An
Overview of International and Regional Provisions, Commentary and Decisions,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13/Add.1, ¶ 2 (May 15, 2009) (“The State duty to protect is
grounded in international human rights law. Guidance from international
human rights bodies suggests that the duty applies to all recognized rights that
private parties are capable of impairing and to all types of business
enterprises.”).
105. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 51-81 (discussing transnational corporations’ duties to
respect human rights).
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The Right to Public Participation and Social Justice

Related to and dependent upon the right to information, is
the right to public participation in decision-making.106 That right,
as enshrined in Article 21 of Nepal’s Interim Constitution,
guarantees groups such as women, indigenous tribes, and poor
peasants and laborers “who are economically, socially or
educationally backward . . . the right to participate in the state
mechanism on the basis of proportional inclusive principles.”107
Like the right to information, various international texts, treaties
and judicial decisions affirm this right of citizens to participate in
decision-making, and further emphasize the importance of
ensuring that traditionally marginalized groups such as women,
racial minorities, and indigenous peoples are accorded adequate
participatory opportunities. These texts and decisions also link
the right to participate with the principle of sustainable
development, treating the former as being instrumental to and
necessary for achievement of the latter.
The World Charter for Nature, a 1982 resolution of the
United Nations General Assembly, states the general principle,
declaring that “[a]ll persons in accordance with their national
legislation, shall have the opportunity to participate, individually
or with others, in the formulation of decisions of direct concern to
their environment.”108 The United Nations resolution on the
Declaration on the Right to Development, passed by the General
Assembly in 1986, indicates that States should do more than
simply permit participation, but “should [also] encourage popular
participation in all spheres as an important factor in
development.”109 The Declaration on the Right to Development
further proclaims that “States have the right and the duty to
formulate” their national development plans “on the basis of
[their populations’] active, free and meaningful participation.”110

106. Dinah Shelton, Environmental Rights, in PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 185, 203
(Philip Alston ed., 2001).
107. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL art. 21 (2007).
108. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, Principle 23, U.N. Doc. A/37/51
(Oct. 28, 1982).
109. Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N. G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 8(2)
(Dec. 14, 1986) (emphasis added).
110. Id. art. 2(3).
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The Rio Declaration similarly acknowledges a right to
participation, and links it with principles of sustainable
development. It appears to go beyond the Declaration on the
Right to Development’s suggestion that States “should encourage”
public participation, stating instead that “each individual shall
have . . . the opportunity to participate in decision-making
processes,” and that “States shall facilitate and encourage public .
. . participation by making information widely available.”111
The Rio Declaration also specifically addresses participatory
rights of vulnerable or frequently marginalized groups,
emphasizing in Principles 20, 21, and 22, respectively, the
importance of ensuring women, the youth, and indigenous people
are able to participate in decision-making in order to achieve
sustainable development.112 The Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women likewise stresses
the need for government to take affirmative steps to guarantee
equal and widespread enjoyment of participatory rights,
requiring “States Parties . . . to ensure to . . . women [in rural
areas] the right [t]o participate in the elaboration and
implementation of development planning at all levels.”113 The
ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries contains numerous provision requiring
State Parties to consult with and ensure the participation of
indigenous groups in a wide range of contexts relating to land and
resource use and development planning.114

111. Rio Declaration, supra note 93, princ. 10 (emphasis added).
112. Id. princs. 20-22.
113. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, art. 14(2)(a), 1249 U.N.T.S. 513 (Dec. 18, 1979).
114. See, e.g., ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, ILO Conv. No. 169, 72 ILO Official Bull. 59, art. 6(1)(a)
(June 27, 1989) (requiring governments to “consult the peoples concerned . . .
whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures
which may affect them directly”); id. art. 6(1)(b) (stating governments should
“establish means by which [indigenous] peoples can freely participate, to at least
the same extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decisionmaking in the elective institutions and administrative and other bodies
responsible for policies and programmes which concern them”); id. art. 7(1)
(“The peoples concerned . . . shall participate in the formulation, implementation
and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional development
which may affect them directly.”).
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With respect to climate change in particular, the UNFCCC
declares that State Parties shall “encourage the widest
participation” in the process of addressing climate change.115
Again, one mechanism for ensuring realization of the right to
public participation that is both codified by Nepal’s domestic
legislation and promoted in international texts is the use of
environmental impact statements.116
Nepal’s Environment Protection Rules, 1997, which form part
of the country’s strategy to fulfill the objectives of Agenda 21 and
to “empower local bodies, women, indigenous people, and dalits117
to participate in the mainstream of development,”118 contain
provisions requiring involvement of the public in preparation of
EIAs and allowing them to review EIAs’ findings. Those rules,
more specifically, obligate project proponents to provide
opportunities for “concerned individuals and institutions” to
comment on the scope of an impending EIA, and to attend and
make comments at hearings regarding the impacts of the
proposed project.119
As noted in the EIA, the FWDR where the WSHP is located
is one of the least developed and poorest regions of the country,
with low rates of literacy and high rates of landlessness,
rendering many households and communities in the region
particularly vulnerable to impacts of the project such as loss of
private and communal property, and disrupted or severed access
115. UNFCCC, supra note 63, art. 4(1)(i).
116. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 93, princs. 10, 17; Agenda 21, supra
note 94, ch. 23, pmbl., ¶ 23.2.
117. SMEC-WSHL describes the term “Dalit” in Vulnerable Community
Development Plan as follows:
In Nepal, the term Dalit traditionally connotes the untouchables, low
castes and castes from whom water is not accepted and whose touch
requires purification by the ‘holy water’. Of late, this term has also been
used to refer to the disadvantaged, downtrodden, marginalized and
oppressed groups. Dalit is not a homogeneous group, and its
heterogeneity extends to language, religion and culture.
SMEC-WSHL, Vulnerable Community Development Plan: Main Report, at 28
(Oct. 2008), available at http://www.wsh.com.np/documents/.
118. Nepal Ministry of Env’t, Sci. & Tech., World Summit on Sustainable
Development (Rio+10) National Assessment Report 2002: Nepal, http://www.
most.gov.np/en/environment/devassessment.php (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
119. Environment Protection Rules, 1997, Chapter 2, Initial Environmental
Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment, ¶¶ 4, 7.
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to social services and connections.120 Of these vulnerable groups,
Dalit and female-headed households in the region are considered
to be especially exposed to project-induced disruptions.121 Efforts
to facilitate and encourage effective participation, therefore, must
take these considerations into account by, for example, presenting
and accepting information orally well as through written
exchanges.
Some non-governmental organizations who have interviewed
people living in FWDR, however, report that participatory rights
are not being respected: local citizens describe not having access
to the EIA, being denied requests for information about
environmental impacts of the project, and being precluded from
providing their comments regarding the project.122 The problem,
however, is even more basic than that in that even if the
information contained in the EIA were disclosed in writing and
through meetings in local languages, the residents would
nevertheless still be denied the ability to meaningfully participate
in analysis and development of the project because of the EIA’s
significant omissions.123 Real participation depends on having
access to relevant information.124 As prepared by SMEC-WSHL
and approved by the GoN and ADB, however, the EIA only
superficially permits participation.125 Such participation does not
satisfy the rights of participation guaranteed under the Nepali
Constitution and informed by domestic and international law.
120. SMEC-WSHL, supra note 117, at ix-2; see also 2000 EIA, supra note 13,
at 93-114.
121. SMEC-WSHL, supra note 117, at ix-2.
122. See JAPAN CENTER FOR A SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY, REPORT
ON THE WEST SETI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT AND ADB POLICY VIOLATIONS
(Version 2) (2007), available at http://www.jacses.org/sdap/westseti/JACSES_
Report_on_West_Seti.pdf.
123. See infra Part II.
124. See generally Rio Declaration, supra note 93, princ. 10 (stating that
“States shall facilitate and encourage public . . . participation by making
information widely available”); Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction:

The Spread of Liberal Democracy and Its Implications for International Law, in
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 14 (Gregory H. Fox &
Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) (stating that “‘the proper conditions’ for the exercise of
popular will” are that choices be “genuinely knowing (based on good
information), willing (not merely a choice among options imposed by the will of
elites or by circumstance), and intelligent (taken in circumstances that allow for
proper reflection)).
125. See infra Part II.

27

JOHNSON

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

538
C.

[Vol. 27

The Right to a Clean Environment

Article 16 of Nepal’s Interim Constitution grants “[e]very
person . . . the right to live in a clean environment.”126 Seemingly
indeterminate, this broad right also gains content through
reference to other rights and obligations under domestic Nepali
law and principles of international law.
More specifically, government abdications of statutory duties
to protect the environment can give rise to a breach of the right to
a clean environment.127 Similarly, violations of other often
complementary rights as “rights to life, association, expression,
information, political participation, personal liberty, equality and
legal redress . . . can be and have been invoked to further
environmental goals,” and thus can be cited to establish a
violation of the right to a clean environment.128
Another important candidate source of guidance for the
interpretation of the right are the “Responsibilities, Directive
Principles and Policies of the State” enshrined in Part Four of the
Interim Constitution.129 Among the relevant responsibilities and
principles are those providing that the “State shall” (1) “make
necessary arrangements to maintain [a] clean environment,” (2)
“give priority to the protection of the environment, and also to the
prevention [of] its further damage due to physical development
activities,” (3) make provisions for the “protection of the forest,
vegetation and biodiversity [and] its sustainable use, and for
equitable distribution of the benefits derived from it,”130 and (4)

126. INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL art. 16 (2007).
127. See, e.g., Advocate Prakash Mani Sharma for Pro Pub. v. His Majesty
Gov’t Cabinet Secretariat and others, WP 2991/1995 (June 9, 1997), available at
http://www.elaw.org/node/1391 (citing government breaches of statutory duties
in support of its holding that the government was not fulfilling with its
obligations to protect the environment).
128. Shelton, supra note 106, at 218.
129. INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL pt. 4 (2007). Although the Interim Constitution
specifies that these responsibilities, principles, and policies do not create any
enforceable rights, the Supreme Court of Nepal has held that such
constitutionally enshrined guidelines nevertheless have meaning for evaluating
whether government actions are valid, and can be given effect through court
order. Advocate Prakash Mani Sharma for Pro Pub. v. His Majesty Gov’t.
Cabinet Secretariat & Others, WP 2991/1995 (June 9, 1997), available at
http://www.elaw.org/node/1391.
130. INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL art. 35(5) (2007) (emphasis added).
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“use existing natural resources including water resources of the
country for the interest of the nation.”131
International law regarding the scope and content of the
right to a clean environment is also instructive. Because the
GoN’s actions are inconsistent with its obligations under the
UNFCCC to “[t]ake climate change considerations into account . .
. in [its] relevant social, economic and environmental policies and
actions,” with the ICCPR’s guarantees of rights to life, liberty and
security of person,132 and with the Rio Declaration’s principle that
States must fulfill their development goals “so as to equitably
meet developmental and environmental needs of present and
future generations,” such actions are also inconsistent with
Nepali citizens’ rights to a clean environment.
Based on these principles, the approval of the WSHP—a
project which will inundate thousands of hectares of land, involve
the relocation of thousands of people, and will consume the
limited resources of the GoN, and yet which, due to the EIA’s
failure to evaluate the impacts of climate change or evaluate the
entire life of the project, likely has significant unknown but major
environmental and economic implications for present and future
generations of Nepali people—violates the right to a clean
environment set forth in the Interim Constitution.

131. Id. art. 33(o).
132. Several national and international courts have held that the right to life,
liberty, and/or security is infringed in certain cases involving environmental
harm. The Federal High Court of Nigeria, for example, held that multinational
oil companies violated “fundamental rights to life (including healthy
environment) and dignity of human person” by flaring gas. Gbemre v. Shell
Petroleum Dev. Co. Nig. Ltd., No. FHC/B/CS/53/05, at 30 (F.H.C. Nov. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/case-documents/nigeria/ni-shellnov05-judgment.pdf. The European Court of Human Rights, in a 1995 decision,
found that the petitioner’s rights to privacy and family security were violated by
the Spanish government’s failure to “strik[e] a fair balance between the interest
of the town’s economic well-being—that of having a waste-treatment plant—and
the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right to respect for her home and
private family life.” Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277, ¶¶ 6, 44 (1995).
For a discussion of these and additional cases, see Svitlana Kravchenko, Right
to Carbon or Right to Life: Human Rights Approaches to Climate Change, 9 VT.
J. ENVT’L L. 513 (2008).
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V. POSSIBLE MECHANISMS FOR ADDRESSING
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CAUSED BY
THE WSHP
Various actors are involved in pursuing development of the
WSHP, and also play a consequent role in infringing the rights of
the Nepali people to information, social justice, and a clean
environment. There exist, however, promising mechanisms to
seek accountability for at least three of these key players: the
GoN, SMEC/SMEC-WSHL, and the ADB.
A.

Pursuing Public Interest Litigation in Nepal

In Nepal, citizens can seek to hold their government
accountable for violations of Articles 16, 21, and 27 by filing a
public interest action under Article 107 of the Interim
Constitution. The provision states:
The Supreme Court shall, for the enforcement of the
fundamental rights conferred by this Constitution, for the
enforcement of any other legal right for which no other
remedy has been provided or for which the remedy even
though provided appears to be inadequate or ineffective, or
for the settlement of any constitutional or legal question
involved in any dispute of public interest or concern, have
the extraordinary power to issue necessary and appropriate
orders to enforce such rights or settle the dispute. For these
purposes, the Supreme Court may, with a view to imparting
full justice and providing the appropriate remedy, issue
appropriate orders and writs including the writs of habeas
corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo
warranto.133
The Supreme Court of Nepal has interpreted this provision to
grant broad rights of standing;134 and public interest groups have
133. INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL art. 107(2) (2007).
134. See, e.g., Advocate Prakash Mani Sharma for Pro Pub. v. His Majesty
Gov’t. Cabinet Secretariat & Others, WP 2991/1995 (1997), available at
http://www.elaw.org/node/1391 (holding that the petitioner had standing to
bring an action to enforce a principle set forth under Part Four of the
Constitution); Suray Prasad Sharma Dhungel v. Godavari Marble Industries &
Others, WP 35/1992 (Oct. 31, 1995), available at http://www.elaw.org/node/1849
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accordingly successfully exploited the opportunities afforded by
that provision to enforce human rights, including the right to
information regarding a dam development project135 and the right
to a clean environment.136 Based on these prior successes, one
advisable strategy would be for public interest groups challenging
the implementation of the WSHP to file an action seeking to halt
the project and obtain an order compelling the GoN to require
SMEC-WSHL to prepare an adequate EIA.
B.

Filing a Petition with the National Human Rights
Commission in Nepal

A second strategy targeting the GoN is to file a petition with
the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), arguing, like
the petition to the Supreme Court would, that the GoN’s approval
of the deficient EIA violates the rights of Nepali people to
information, social justice, and a clean environment. The NHRC,
which was established under the Interim Constitution in 2007 in
order to fill the role of a body compliant with the so-called “Paris
Principles,”137 has a broad mandate to promote and protect
human rights in the country, powers to conduct inquiries and
investigations on its own initiative or in response to a petition or

(holding that petitioner environmental groups had standing to bring an action to
enforce the right to a clean environment as part of the right to life). These cases
were brought under a similar provision in the prior version of the Nepali
Constitution.
135. See, e.g., Himalayan and Peninsular Hydro-Ecological Network,
Successful Campaigning Against Large Dams: The Shelving of Arun III,
http://www.bothends.info/service/ip-dam.htm#successful (last visited Apr. 30,
2010) (describing the case in which NGOs prevailed in an action to seek
information regarding the development of the proposed so-called “Arun III” 201
MW hydropower project); Alfred Escher, World Bank Withdraws from Arun III
Project at Inspection Panel’s Recommendation, 3 HUM. RIGHTS BRIEF 1 (1995),
available at www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v3i1/wldbnk31.htm.
136. See, e.g., Suray Prasad Sharma Dhungel v. Godavari Marble Indus. &
Others, WP 35/1992 (Oct. 31, 1995), available at http://www.elaw.org/node/1849.
137. The “Paris Principles” are the Principles relating to the Status of
National Institutions, adopted by United Nations General Assembly in a
December 1993 resolution. National Institutions for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 48/134, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134
(Dec. 20, 1993). The Paris Principles set forth model guidelines for the
establishment, role, responsibilities, operation and authority of national
institutions “vested with competence to promote and protect human rights.” Id.
¶ 1.
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complaint, and the authority to make recommendations for action
against the perpetrator and/or the officials who negligently or
recklessly failed to prevent the rights violations.138 In performing
its functions, the NHRC can “exercise the same powers as the
court . . . in requiring any person to appear before [it] for
recording his/her statement[,] . . . receiving and examining
evidence, [and] ordering . . . the production of any physical
proof.”139
In the year from July 2007 to June 2008, the NHRC received
1,137 complaints alleging various human rights abuses, including
killing, abduction, torture, property seizure, and violations of
economic, social and cultural rights.140 It investigated 728 cases,
and issued recommendations or settled 459.141 It also “[h]eld over
a dozen . . . dialogues with . . . senior officials of [the GoN]” and
with “heads of some corporations . . . on the issues various rights
such [the] right to life, right to movement, economic and social
rights, [and] rights of prisoners.”142 It is thus active, but with a
workload that might prevent a prompt response. Nevertheless,
due to the NHRC’s position as an independent body capable of
inquiring into the actions of other government officials, its broad
powers, and its ability to issue remedial orders, a petition to it
detailing the violations resulting from the submission and
approval of the WSHP’s EIA could be an effective way to halt the
project to require preparation of a revised EIA.143
138. In 2000, the NHRC was established as a statutory body under the
Human Rights Commission Act 1997. Part 15 of the Interim Constitution
converted it into an independent constitutional body, and now defines its role
and responsibilities. National Human Rights Commission (Nepal), About Us,
http://www.nhrcnepal.org/about_us.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2010); INTERIM
CONST. OF NEPAL pt. 15 (2007).
139. INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL pt. 15, art. 132(3)(i) (2007).
140. NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (NEPAL), ANNUAL PROGRESS
REPORT (JULY 2007-JUNE 2008) 1 (2008), available at http://www.nhrc
nepal.org/publication/doc/reports/Annual-Report-Eng-2007-08.pdf.
Many
of
these cases arose of out of the conflict between the GoN and the Communist
Party of Nepal—Maoist, see generally id.
141. Id. at 1.
142. Id. at 15.
143. Through email correspondence with Nepali activists on human rights and
water issues, I learned that they had not pursued filing a complaint with the
NHRC because the NHRC’s work had previously been limited to investigation of
civil and political rights. The NHRC now, however, also investigates claims of
violations of economic, social and cultural rights. Moreover, even if the NHRC’s
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Filing a Request for Consultation and Compliance
Review with the ADB

Petitions to the Supreme Court of Nepal and the NHRC
could, in connection with addressing rights’ violations facilitated
by the GoN’s approval of a deficient EIA, seek remedies that stop
the infringing conduct of third parties such as the ADB and
SMEC-WSHL. An order by either the Supreme Court or NHRC
ordering the government to require a new EIA prior to any
further progress on the WSHP would effectively require those
non-GoN entities to take action to cure the violations. Yet in
addition to those indirect routes, there are other avenues
available to address the actions of the ADB and SMEC-WSHL
parties more directly. One such avenue, which aims at the
actions of the ADB in approving the WSHP, is to file a request for
consultation and compliance with the ADB.
In order to respond to increasing scrutiny by governments
and civil society, and a “shift in development models toward
sustainable development,” the ADB, like other multinational
development banks, began in the 1980s to develop social and
environmental policies and accountability mechanisms.144 As a
result of further development of those efforts, the ADB has
instituted a “consultation” mechanism allowing individuals (or
their representatives) to file complaints alleging that they have,
or are likely to be, directly and materially adversely affected by
an ADB-assisted project, and that the harm is related to an act or
omission of the ADB arising out of its role in the project.145 If the
complaint is eligible,146 the ADB and the complainants will then
mandate or focus were limited, it could still review this issue given that, as I
argue in this paper, the rights violations can also be characterized as violations
of civil and political rights.
144. ASIAN DEV. BANK, REVIEW OF THE INSPECTION FUNCTION: ESTABLISHMENT
OF A NEW ADB ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM, at II (2003), available at
www.adb.org/documents/policies/ADB_accountability_mechanism/ADB_account
ability_mechanism.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
145. Id. at 17-18.
146. Ineligible requests for consultations include those that: (1) are not related
to an act or omission of the ADB; (2) relate to procurement; (3) involve
allegations of fraud or corruption; (4) involve completed projects; (5) have
already been considered (unless there is new evidence); (6) challenge the
adequacy or suitability of an internal ADB policy or procedure; (7) are frivolous,
(8) relate to personnel matters; or (9) involve non-operational issues such as
finance and administration. Id. See also Asian Dev. Bank, The Office of the
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engage in a “Consultation Process” in an attempt to identify
solutions to the identified problems.147 Once the consultation
request is filed, the complainants may also file a request for
“compliance review.”148 This mechanism is a separate system
designed specifically to address the ADB’s violations of its own
policies and procedures.149
Requests for consultation and/or compliance review in the
case of the WSHP could raise issues alleging, for example, that
the ADB negligently approved a misleading EIA, or that its
approval of the EIA was inconsistent with its internal policies
regarding environmental impact assessments and dissemination
of information and meaningful involvement of stakeholders. It
could also argue that the ADB’s approval of the EIA violated
baseline standards set forth in the Equator Principles150 (which
were launched by the World Bank and International Finance
Corporation and have since been widely adopted by financial
institutions worldwide)151 instructing lenders to ensure that,
among other tasks, borrowers have: (1) performed an “adequate,
accurate, and objective evaluation and presentation”152 of the
“social and environmental impacts, risks, and opportunities of
projects”153 for key areas of the project’s life-cycle from pre-

Special Project Facilitator Consultation Primer: Procedure for Complaint
Handling, http://www.adb.org/SPF/default.asp (last visited May 1, 2009),
[hereinafter Asian Dev. Bank, Consultation Primer].
147. Asian Dev. Bank, The Consultation Phase of ADB’s Accountability
Mechanism, http://www.adb.org/SPF/default.asp (last visited May 1, 2009).
148. Id. See also Asian Dev. Bank, Consultation Primer, supra note 146, at 811.
149. See Asian Dev. Bank, Consultation Primer, supra note 146, at 8-11.
150. The Equator Principles: A Benchmark for the Financial Industry to
Manage Social and Environmental Issues in Project Financing, http://www.
equator-principles.com./ (last visited May 1, 2010).
151. Katinka Jesse & Marie-Jose van der Heijden, Corporate Environmental

Accountability as a Means for Intragenerational Equity; ‘Hidden’ Environmental
Impacts in the North-South Conflict, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 346 (2008) (describing the Equator Principles
and noting that over fifty private international operating banks had volunteered
to adhere to them).
152. INT’L FIN. CORP., PERFORMANCE STANDARD I: SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL A SSESSMENT AND M ANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 2 (2006), http://www.ifc.org/
ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol_PerformanceStandards2006_fu
ll/$FILE/IFC+Performance+Standards.pdf.
153. Id. at i.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/4

34

JOHNSON_FINAL

2010

ADVOCACY STRATEGIES

545

construction, through operation, to decommissioning or closure;154
and (2) “effective[ly engaged the] community. . .
through
disclosure of project-related information and consultation with
local communities on matters that directly affect them.”155
Such petitions to development banks have proven to be
useful advocacy strategies in analogous contexts. Indeed, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Nepal had significant
success with this strategy when challenging the development of
another large dam, the proposed 201 MW Arun III project, in the
mid-1990s.156 Several NGOs filed a petition with the World
Bank’s newly created Inspection Panel, arguing that the bank
had violated its internal regulations in supporting the project.
The Inspection Panel conducted an investigation and found that
World Bank policies had in fact been violated in connection with
the Arun III project.157 After receiving the Inspection Panel’s
report, the President of the World Bank decided to withdraw the
bank’s support from Arun III.158
Given the rights and policy violations in the case of the
proposed WSHP, a similar petition to the ADB could be an
important strategy for those seeking to ensure the WSHP, if it
proceeds, does not do so at the expense of Nepali citizens’ rights.
D.

Filing a Submission with Australia’s National
Contact Point Pursuant to the Guidelines

A fourth strategy advocates could use to address rights
violations arising out of the WSHP could be to utilize the
procedures set forth in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (Guidelines) in order to induce SMEC/SMEC-WSHL’s

154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at i.
156. See Erik K. MacDonald, Playing by the Rules: The World Bank’s Failure
to Adhere to Policy in the Funding of Large-Scale Hydropower Projects, 31
ENVTL. L. 1011 (2001) (discussing the Arun III development project and the
World Bank’s review of it); Daniel D. Bradlow, A Test Case for the World Bank,
11 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 247 (1996) (also discussing the Arun III
development project and the World Bank’s review of it); Himalayan and
Peninsular Hydro-Ecological Network, supra note 135 (also discussing the
same); Escher, supra note 135 (also discussing the same).
157. See Bradlow, supra note 156, at 280-82.
158. Id. at 281 (describing the World Bank’s withdrawal from the project).
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compliance with the Guidelines (and respect for the rights of
Nepali people) in connection with its pursuit of the WSHP.
The Guidelines are recommendations OECD countries have
agreed to make to the multinational enterprises operating within
or from their territories in order to promote sustainable
development and adherence to standards in such areas as human
rights, environmental protection, and corruption.159 Each OECD
country has also committed to have a “National Contact Point”
available to review claims regarding its multinationals’ conduct
abroad.160
With respect to the WSHP, two Guideline principles are
particularly relevant and could serve as a basis for a submission
by advocates to Australia’s NCP (ANCP): namely, the principles
that multinationals should (1) “[c]ontribute to economic, social
and environmental progress with a view to achieving sustainable
development;” and (2) “[r]espect the human rights of those
affected by their activities consistent with the host government’s
international obligations and commitments.”161 Upon receiving a
complaint, the ANCP may investigate the complaint, make its
office available to help facilitate a mediated outcome of a specific
case, and prepare findings and statements regarding the
matter.162 While the NCP process has been criticized for not
159. OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises, in GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 5 (2008), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
160. OECD, Implementation Procedures of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, in GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 27,
30 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf
(requiring parties to establish NCPs for “handling inquiries and discussions
with the parties concerned on all matters covered by the Guidelines so that they
can contribute to the solution of problems which may arise in this connection”).
161. OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, in GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 7, 14 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf; see also id. at 19-20 (stating that an environmental
impact assessment should be prepared when “proposed activities may have
significant environmental, health, or safety impacts,” and that “the lack of full
scientific certainty [should not be used] as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent or minimize such damage”); The Australian National
Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, The
Australian National Contact Point, http://www.ausncp.gov.au/content/contact_
point.asp?areaid=18 (last visited Apr. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Australian National
Contact Point] (describing its roles and responsibilities and providing links to
further information).
162. Australian National Contact Point, supra note 161.
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living up to its potential to promote adherence to the
Guidelines,163 NGOs have recently reported being satisfied with
the ANCP’s willingness to investigate claims.164 This strategy
could therefore be a useful complement to the other three as it
would focus attention directly on SMEC/SMEC-WSHL, and would
not require a huge investment of resources due to the informal
nature of the system and the work already being done in
connection with pursuing the other avenues.
VI. ANALOGOUS ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS
The issues highlighted above regarding the importance of
assessing impacts on and by climate change are by no means
unique to the WSHP. Indeed, that project is just one part of a
major undertaking by governments and developers throughout
the Himalayan region to develop dams for hydropower, water
storage and other purposes over the coming decades—projects
which
also
trigger
similar
climate
change-related
considerations.165 Illustrating the scope of the issue, a 2008 study
by International Rivers reported that Nepal, Pakistan, Bhutan
and India aim to expand the number of hydropower projects in
their Himalayan regions from the 100 currently existing to a
future total of 552.166 The roughly 450 projects already under
construction or planned for future development seek to increase
current hydropower generating capacity from approximately
35,000 MW to nearly 190,000 MW.167 These projects, like the
WSHP, are in areas extremely vulnerable to and already
experiencing some of the most pronounced effects of climate
163. See, e.g., John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and other Business Organizations, A/HRC/8/5, ¶ 98 (Apr. 7, 2008)
(“The NCPs are potentially an important vehicle for providing remedy.
However, with a few exceptions, experience suggests that in practice they have
too often failed to meet this potential.”); OECD Watch, 2008 Review of National

Contact Points and Their Implementation of the OECD Guidelines: Submission
to the Annual Meeting of NCPs, June 2008, http://baseswiki.org/w/images/
en/7/7d/OECD_Watch_2008_Review_of_National_Contact_Points_and_the_Impl
ementation_of_the_OECD_Guidelines.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2009),
[hereinafter OECD Watch 2008 Review].
164. OECD Watch 2008 Review, supra note 163, at 5.
165. INT’L RIVERS, supra note 4, at 6-7.
166. Id. at 7.
167. Id.
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change;168 and consequently, also like the WSHP, these projects
require analysis of how climate change affects projections about
their environmental impacts, physical sustainability, economic
returns, and ability to advance their development goals.169
Moreover, the need to take climate change-related
considerations into account in major development projects
extends beyond the Himalayan region and the specific context of
dam development. Scholars, policymakers, and development
professionals increasingly recognize the need to systematically
integrate analysis of climate change adaptation issues within
development activities so as to ensure those undertakings are
environmentally and economically sustainable.170 They likewise
168. See supra notes 4, 36-46.
169. See INT’L RIVERS, supra note 4, at 4, 32-36.
170. See, e.g., OECD, DECLARATION ON INTEGRATING CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION INTO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION (2006), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/44/29/36426943.pdf (adopted by Development and Environment
Ministers of OECD Member Countries April 4, 2006 and describing the
importance of and pledging that the OECD Member Governments “will work to
better integrate climate change adaptation in development planning and
assistance”); SIMONE GIGLI & SHARDUL AGRAWALA, STOCKTAKING OF PROGRESS ON
INTEGRATING ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE INTO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
ACTIVITIES (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/62/39216288.
pdf (discussing growing awareness of need to integrate adaptation planning
with development activities and discussing approaches being used to further,
and challenges arising from, such integration); WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTALLY
AND SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT VICE PRESIDENCY & INFRASTRUCTURE
VICE PRESIDENCY, CLEAN ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS AN INVESTMENT
FRAMEWORK (2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMM
INT/Documentation/20890696/DC2006-0002(E)-CleanEnergy.pdf (noting how
“[i]t is generally accepted that adaptation needs to be mainstreamed into
national planning and finance agendas.”); WORLD BANK, VICE PRESIDENCY FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AN INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK FOR CLEAN ENERGY AND
DEVELOPMENT: A PROGRESS REPORT (2006), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/21046509/DC2006-0012(E)CleanEnergy.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK CLEAN ENERGY INVESTMENT
FRAMEWORK].
Assessment of climate risks needs to become a regular part of the due
diligence of development planning. For this to occur . . . appropriate
information and tools for screening for climate risk must be readily
available; and new standards for planning and infrastructure must be
devised. In the longer term [there must be] “better management of
climate variability and its implications in all relevant sectors, including
inter alia” infrastructure, agriculture, natural resources and health.

Id. at 37-38 (internal citations omitted); CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF WATER RESOURCES,
MANAGING

AN
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increasingly recognize how the imperative to combat climate
change and the consequent expanding landscape of foreseeable
regulations raising the price on carbon or imposing limits on
emissions are factors that should be considered given their
possible impacts on projects’ economic, environmental, and
political feasibility.171
When, as in the case of the WSHP, a development project will
have a foreseeable effect on and/or be affected by climate change,
government authorities (or other responsible entities) must
assess those impacts and disseminate their findings to the
public.172 Failure to do so will not only be unwise from a
development perspective, but may also violate affected
individuals’ human rights to information, public participation and
social justice, and a clean environment—rights which are
supported and informed by international law,173 as well as
countries’ domestic legal systems.174 To address or prevent such
(2008), available at http://www.water.ca.gov/climatechange/docs/ClimateChange
WhitePaper.pdf (providing an example of government efforts to integrate
consideration of adaptation issues within current planning and investment
decision-making); Daniel A. Farber, Adaptation Planning and Climate Impact
Assessments: Learning from NEPA’s Flaws, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,605 (2009)
(discussing need and mechanisms for ensuring “that we evaluate adaptation
needs through a sensible, well-designed process”); Mark Latham, Environmental

Liabilities and the Federal Securities Laws: A Proposal for Improved Disclosure
of Climate Change-Related Risks, 39 ENVTL. L. 647, 649-707 (2009) (This article
illustrates various ways in which climate change may impact businesses and
investments. Many of these impacts could be reduced or eliminated, however,
with appropriate planning and adaptation efforts).
171. See generally, Latham, supra note 170, at 658-63 (discussing some of the
climate change-related regulatory risks and associated liabilities businesses
should take into account); WORLD BANK CLEAN ENERGY INVESTMENT
FRAMEWORK, supra note 170, at 16 (noting that policies and regulations
mandating the use of specific or cleaner technologies, pricing and taxation
measures, and caps on emissions all can affect decisions on investment in
energy infrastructure). See also supra notes 35, 101 (discussing requirements
that governments consider projects’ possible impacts on climate change).
172. See supra Part III.
173. See supra Part III. See also Barry E. Hill, Steve Wolfson & Nicholas
Targ, Human Rights and the Environment: A Synopsis and Some Predictions,
16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. Rev. 359, 378-81 (2004) (discussing recognition of the
right to a clean and/or healthy environment under international treaties and by
international human rights bodies).
174. Various authors have referred to the number of national constitutions
incorporating rights to a clean and/or healthy environment, and generally state
that there are roughly 100 such constitutions. See, e.g., Kirk W. Junker, Ethical
Emissions Trading and the Law, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 160 (2006) (“[A]
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violations, advocates can use many of the same or analogous
mechanisms discussed above in the context of the WSHP. In
particular, many domestic courts throughout the world grant
broad rights of standing for citizens to seek redress for violations
of their constitutional rights, which may often include the rights
to information and to a clean environment.175 Similarly, a host of
nations and sub-national government entities have established
human rights institutions (“NHRIs”) like Nepal’s NHRC to
specifically receive and resolve claims of human rights

survey of constitutions around the world yields more than one hundred
constitutions that explicitly include the right to a clean natural environment
among the catalogue of individual rights.”); James R. May, Constituting
Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 113,
114-15 (2006).
[O]f the 130 constitutions that address the environment, only about sixty
grant individuals what may fairly be characterized as a fundamental
right to a ‘clean,’ ‘healthful,’ or ‘favorable’ environment . . . [And] of these
sixty, only a handful have earned judicial imprimatur as being
enforceable by affected individuals. Yet because most [of these
constitutional provisions protecting fundamental environmental rights]
are less than a decade old, their transformative repercussions are only
beginning to be detected.

Id.; Hill, Wolfson & Targ, supra note 173, at 381. “More than ninety national
constitutions recognize a duty owed by the national government to its citizens to
prevent harm to the environment. Of these, over fifty recognize the importance
of a healthy environment, either as a duty of the state or as a right.” Id. The
authors also note, however, that it is still the “vast minority of countries” in
which “courts are finding environmental constitutional provisions self-executing,
conveying both procedural and substantive rights.” Id. at 382. The right to
information is similarly reflected and protected in national law throughout the
world. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 87, at 328 (stating that as of 2006 at
least 68 countries had enacted laws protecting freedom of information). Indeed,
according to one calculation, more than “170 different states, provinces and
nations have enacted EIA legislation” promoting assessment and dissemination
of information relating to environmental impacts. Nicholas A. Robinson, “NEPA
and the Rest of the World”: Models for Strengthening EIA from Many Nations,
SG026 ALI-ABA 285, 287 (2001) (citing N.A. Robinson, EIA Abroad: The
Comparative and Transnational Experience, in ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS—THE
NEPA EXPERIENCE 679 (Stephen G. Hildebrand & Johnnie B. Cannon eds.,
1992); see also id. at 290 (stating that “[m]ost developing nations have enacted
EIA legislation”).
175. See Hill, Wolfson & Targ, supra note 173, at 382-89 (discussing legal
actions to protect human rights to a clean and/or healthy environment (rights
which are sometimes derivative of other rights such as the right to life) under
the constitutions of India, the Philippines, Columbia, Chile).
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violations.176 Further, when international financial institutions
such as the ADB, African Development Bank, Inter-American
Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, International Finance Corporation and World Bank
support the challenged projects, advocates may also seek review
and relief from those entities’ internal accountability and
compliance mechanisms.177 The NCP system established to
ensure and promote implementation of the OECD Guidelines also
enables petitioners to raise allegations of improper conduct by
176. The United Nations has been actively encouraging creation of these
national human rights institutions for decades. See U.N. Centre for Human
Rights, National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the Establishment

and Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, Professional Training Series No. 4 at 4--6, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/4
(1995) [hereinafter NHRI Handbook]; see also supra note 137 (referring to the
“Paris Principles,” guidelines for establishment and operation of NHRIs).
NHRIs have been defined as bodies “established by a Government under the
constitution, or by law or decree, the functions of which are specifically defined
in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights.” NHRI Handbook,
supra, ¶ 39; see also Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role

of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights
Protection, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2000) (discussing the history, structures,
powers, and effectiveness of NHRIs). More than 100 of these institutions have
now been created throughout the world. National Human Rights Institutions
Forum, National Human Rights Institutions, http://www.nhri.net/NationalData.
asp?ID=107 (last visited May 1, 2010) (containing database of NHRIs around
the world). In Latin America alone, countries that have established NHRIs
include Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Argentina,
Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Columbia. Reif, supra note 176, at 51.
177. See supra Part III.C (discussing those mechanisms in the ADB and World
Bank); see also CAROLINE REES & DAVID VERMIJS, MAPPING GRIEVANCE
MECHANISMS IN THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARENA 71-91, 103-08 (2008)
(discussing the compliance mechanisms of the African Development Bank, ADB,
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American
Development Bank, and World Bank). Many of these mechanisms do not provide
for analysis of the institutions’ and/or their contractors’ compliance with human
rights or environmental standards per se, but instead examine whether the
institutions complied with their own policies and procedures. Id. While they
represent progress in ensuring international financial institutions respect
human rights and environmental standards, these internal mechanisms are
nevertheless subject to criticism on the ground that they do not sufficiently
“narrow[ ] the accountability gap” left by application of national and
international laws to multinational entities. See, e.g., Nathalie L. Bridgeman &
David B. Hunter, Narrowing the Accountability Gap: Toward a New Foreign
Investor Accountability Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 187 (2008)
(analyzing and critiquing the accountability mechanisms of institutions such as
the International Finance Corporation, World Bank, and OECD, and proposing
an alternative mechanism).
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any MNE operating from or within the territory of any OECD
country.178 Finally, though not discussed above in the context of
the WSHP, additional strategies that advocates may employ to
prevent and remedy human rights violations resulting from
inadequate
consideration
of
climate
change-related
considerations include bringing claims for declaratory or other
relief from international human rights bodies such as the United
Nations Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR,179 the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights,180 and the European Court of Human Rights.181
VII. CONCLUSION
The challenges posed by climate change require that
countries examine their development strategies to ensure that
their planned projects are resilient to the impacts of climate
change, do not unnecessarily exacerbate the climate change
challenge, and maximize countries’ competitive advantages in an
era in which the presence of GHG sinks and low national
emissions are exploitable assets. Due diligence is necessary to
178. See supra notes 160-63.
179. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (“A State Party to the Covenant
that becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the
Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to
its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any
of the rights set forth in the Covenant.”).
180. The members of the Organization of American States (OAS) created the
Inter-American Commission (Commission) in 1959 to help promote human
rights in the region. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, What is
the IACHR?, http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2010) (in
1965, the OAS authorized the Commission to examine petitions and complaints
alleging violations of human rights by OAS member states). See also American
Convention on Human Rights arts. 41-51 O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force 18 July 1978 (describing the functions,
competence and powers of the Commission). Among its remedial powers, the
Commission may recommend member states take measures to protect human
rights or prevent violations. Id. It can also submit cases to the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. Id. arts. 48-64.
181. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 34, adopted Nov. 5, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155 (“The
Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organization
or group of individuals claiming to the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols
thereto.”).
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ensure development activities properly consider impacts by and
on climate change. The case of the WSHP illustrates the
importance of these principles. Development of that hydropower
project may be an important strategy for India and Nepal. Yet it
should not be pursued as it has—without an adequate
assessment of its costs and benefits, and at the expense of the
rights of the Nepali people to information, social justice, and a
clean environment. Advocates have and should thus use the
various tools available to them to seek to cure those rights
violations and hold the parties responsible, SMEC-WSHL, the
GoN, and the ADB, to account.
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